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• The regional elections in Solo held on 9 December 2020 attracted much attention 
because President Jokowi's first son, Gibran Rakabuming, ran for mayor with the 
support of PDIP, which controls 60% of the seats in the local parliament.  
 
• In nominating Gibran, PDIP sacrificed its local candidate Achmad Purnomo, the 
incumbent vice major who had long served the party’s grassroots. Initially, Gibran 
faced resistance from the local party apparatus, but clinched the nomination with 
endorsement from party chief Megawati Sukarnoputri and provincial party officials. 
Gibran rallied a large coalition and secured support from all political parties in the local 
parliament (40 out of 45 seats) except for the Islamist party, PKS.  
 
• Following Gibran’s nomination, an independent candidate pair, Bagyo Wahyono and 
FX Suparjo, emerged to challenge him. These two were largely unfamiliar faces in 
Solo, with little prospect of withstanding Gibran's political machine, backed as it was 
by Indonesia’s most powerful politician. 
 
• Gibran eventually won by a landslide, amidst conspiracy theories that the challengers 
were token candidates put up to avoid a possible avalanche of protest votes which could 
negate Gibran’s victory.  
 
• Gibran’s victory signals President Jokowi becoming the head of a political family more 
than it is about the impressive achievement of a newcomer politician. It also suggests 
that regional politics is now more about having social capital than it is about inter-party 
































One of the most important races, and one that received the most attention, during the 2020 
regional head elections in Indonesia, was the mayoral race in Solo, or Surakarta city. 1 The 
reason for that was because the race involved the son of President Joko Widodo (affectionately 
known as Jokowi), Gibran Rakabuming. Solo is President Jokowi’s hometown. He started his 
political career in this city 15 years ago and rose meteorically to the national level. Jokowi built 
an image as a self-made businessman, and his down-to-earth approach to politics, called 
blusukan (impromptu visits to lower class residences), captured the imagination of many 
Indonesians. He rose to prominence due to his populist rhetoric and his background as an 
outsider to Indonesia’s mainstream politics.2 The rise of Gibran, however, is at odds with the 
whole image projected about his father. Gibran is seen more as a product of dynastic politics 
rather than as a self-made politician. Without his father’s big name, many believe that it would 
not have been possible for him to have become mayor of Solo. 
 
A dynastic politician can be defined as someone who runs for public office with the advantage 
of being related by blood and/or marriage to politicians who are in power. Studies in India3 and 
Japan4 have found that dynasty is as much related to democracy as it is to an authoritarian 
system. In a democracy, a political dynasty can dominate politics through elections. The 
number of candidates of this type is on the rise in Indonesia, and this situation has been called 
the “new normal”.5 
 
President Jokowi is being accused of building a political dynasty6 because both his son and 
son-in-law ran for mayoral positions—in Solo and Medan respectively. This is a drastic 
reversal from his previous position. Before his reelection in 2019, Jokowi boasted about how 
proud he was that his children stayed away from politics, and instead focused on cultivating 
their businesses.7 His children also then expressed disinterest in joining their father to pursue 
a career in politics. All this changed in the few months that followed Jokowi’s reelection. 
 
This Perspective aims to elucidate some aspects of the regional election in Solo. Why did 
Gibran decide to run for office in Solo after denying that he had political ambitions? What were 
the dynamics like during the election and what led to Gibran's landslide victory? And, most 
importantly, what are the consequences of Gibran's victory on national politics and on Jokowi's 
political future?  
 
GIBRAN RAKABUMING: A SUDDEN CANDIDATE 
 
Since Jokowi became president, Gibran Rakabuming had often said that he had no interest in 
politics. During Jokowi’s re-election campaign, Gibran claimed that he was not involved in 
any way.8 That was in September 2018. A year later, Gibran was seen visiting FX Hadi 
Rudyatmo (Rudy), the Mayor of Solo who is also the local chairman of PDIP, and disclosed to 
Rudy his intention to run in the upcoming Solo mayoral election. 9  
 
Indeed, things were politically complicated. By that time, the Solo branch of PDIP had already 
decided on a candidate pair for the election. This was then-deputy mayor Achmad Purnomo 
for mayor and Teguh Prakosa, a local PDIP man, for vice-mayor. Gibran, however, would not 
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He went to the provincial PDIP to asked to be the party’s candidate for Solo mayor. They 
complied,10 overruling the Solo branch decision to back Achmad Purnomo.  
 
The decision outraged PDIP cadres and activists in Solo. The PDIP bylaw states that the 
regency or city level branch has the right to nominate a candidate for regional head (bupati) or 
mayoral (walikota) elections.11 Rudy, the mayor and the local chairman of PDIP, aired his 
frustration over the blatant violation of the party’s regulations.12  
 
Gibran gained the upper hand, however, when Megawati Sukarnoputri, the party chairwoman, 
agreed to his nomination. Achmad Purnomo retracted his candidacy while Teguh Prakosa, his 
candidate for vice-mayor, became Gibran’s running mate. In July 2020, Jokowi invited 
Achmad Purnomo to the palace to offer him a government position at the national level. 
Purnomo refused the offer and chose instead to stay in Solo to run his businesses. 
 
Gibran met almost no challenge in garnering support from the political parties in Solo. 
According to election rules, a candidate must be supported by parties that control at least 20% 
of the DPRD seats or that represent 25% of the votes obtained in the 2019 legislative elections. 
PDIP is the largest political party in Solo with 60% seats in the local parliament, which put 
Gibran easily pass that criterion.  
 
Gibran did not even need support from other political parties since PDIP’s backing was already 
enough to ensure his candidacy. He chose however to fortify his position by embracing the six 
parties in the city parliament. All lined up behind him except the Islamist PKS, giving him 
support from 40 of 45 seats (88.9%).13 
  
Overwhelming support from the parties did not automatically mean victory for Gibran. His 
team understood the lesson from the 2018 mayoral election in Makassar, South Sulawesi, in 
which a political dynasty candidate who was supported overwhelmingly by the parties in the 
local parliament, lost nevertheless to the ballot’s empty box, a protest option for Indonesian 
voters.14  
 
To be sure, Gibran seemed overawed by his own political strength and the overwhelming size 
of his coalition. His hegemonic coalition was hindering his team from understanding grassroots 
electoral dynamics, and it worried about resistance from within PDIP since his nomination had 
resulted from party elite support rather than grassroots popularity. Having the ballot’s empty 
box as an opponent was a risk Gibran did not wish to take. More importantly, a loss to the 
empty box by him would embarrass President Jokowi and damage his political stature 
nationally.  
 
And then, unexpectedly, the election commission quite late in the day validated an independent 
candidate pair to run against Gibran.  
 
BAJO: AN UNLIKELY OPPONENT 
 
Indonesia’s election law stipulates that independent candidates must have the support of at least 
8.5% of registered voters in the 2019 election and these are to be spread over more than 50% 
of the subdistricts (kecamatan). In Solo, it means that the candidates must show support from 
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As of January 2020, there were two independent candidate pairs in the Solo election: 
Muhammad Ali Achmad-Abu Jazid (Alam), and Bagyo Wahyono-FX. Supardjo (Bajo). A 
third pair, Muhammad Ali Achmad-Abu Jazid (Alam), dropped out after failing to meet the 
requirements. 
  
On 21 February 2020, Bagyo Wahyono-FX Supardjo (Bajo) submitted 41,425 ID cards as 
proof of support to the local general election commission. The commission performed 
administrative and factual verifications and found that only 36,006 of these ID cards met 
requirements. On 26 July 2020, a month after Gibran-Teguh had been declared as candidates, 
Bajo added a further 21,603 ID cards. The election commission all in all verified 38,831 of the 
total ID cards, and this qualified Bajo to bid for the mayoral position. 
 
Bagyo Wahyono and FX Supardjo are newcomers to Solo politics. Bagyo works as a tailor in 
Pasar Gede, a traditional market in downtown Solo, and FX Supardjo is a retiree from a job 
training centre and is chairman of the neighbourhood association (Rukun Warga). The pair 
claimed they were supported by a grassroots organisation called Tikus Pitih Hanata Baris.15  
 
Bajo was thus an unexpected candidate, and many questions were asked about the pair: Were 
they in the race for real or were they just puppet candidates to ensure that Gibran did not 
compete against the empty box on the ballot? Who was behind Bajo’s candidacy? How would 




Bajo proved no match for Gibran in all respects. The pair could not afford to have a proper 
campaign organisation, nor could they afford to campaign online, something necessary during 
the Covid-19 pandemic, when there were no mass rallies or face-to-face meetings. 
 
The huge disparity between the two campaigns could be seen in the funds involved. Gibran 
spent IDR 3.2 billion (S$3.2 million) against Bajo’s IDR 152 million (S$152K). Gibran’s 
campaign was technologically savvy and he conducted virtual campaigns by setting up virtual 
station boxes that enabled him to talk directly to voters. He called this virtual blusukan—
referring to the impromptu visits to lower-class settlements, which had characterised his 
father’s campaign style. 
 
Gibran talked about making Solo a creative hub for millennials and frequently mentioned 
‘Industrial Revolution 4.0’.16 He appealed to young people and tried to project himself as a 
business-friendly candidate by virtue of being a businessman himself.  
 
Bajo, on the other hand, campaigned by offering plans that even they themselves were not 
certain about delivering. They planned to transform Solo into a ‘megapolitan’ city but rarely 
mentioned what kind of city they actually envisioned. They also promised to solve traffic 
congestion by building subways, and to deal with frequent flooding. Unlike Gibran, Bajo did 
not offer a vision to make Solo a sophisticated tech-based city. They tried to appeal to lower 
class voters but did not address the specific issues that usually attract them, such as housing, 
welfare, healthcare or education.  
 
Bajo countered Gibran’s virtual blusukan with a traditional campaign method. They called it 
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the electorate in a slow manner through the cultivation of personal relationships with the 
women in the household, then with families at large, and finally with the whole community. 17 
This was a method used under the New Order, by Golkar and the military to mobilise voters.  
 
As the campaign approached the finish line, there were reports in the media about how exactly 
Bajo had managed to qualify as independent candidates, particularly in how ID cards were 
collected. The report said that people who were certified by the election commission as Bajo 
supporters never actually endorsed them.18 This raised suspicions that Bajo’s candidacy was 
actually a sham. 
 
A few days before the election, a corroborative report provided further details about Bajo. It 
found that a third party had been contracted by a police intelligence officer to collect ID cards 
for Bajo, and IDR 1.5 billion (S$1.5 million) were transferred to an operative in Solo to collect 
the ID cards. The funds had come from a police general.19 While it remains unclear whether or 
not that police general provided supported for Bajo under orders from a higher ranking official, 
suspicions grew ever stronger that there indeed was a scheme to prevent Gibran from having 
to compete against the empty box (kotak kosong). 
 
A LANDSLIDE VICTORY 
 
A poll released two days before the election (7 December) by IndoBarometer showed that 
Gibran-Teguh would get 67.8% of the vote, against only 4% for Bajo. The rest of the 
respondents said: As yet decided (19.8%); Keeping their vote secret (6.3%); Don’t know 
(1.3%); Will not vote (1%).20 It seemed pretty clear that Gibran would win by a landslide.  
 
The final count showed Gibran winning 86.5% (225,419) of the votes while Bajo only got 
11.4% (35,133). Gibran won in all sub-districts (kecamatan) in Solo while Bajo won less votes 
than the number of IDs that they had needed to collect during the process to become an 
independent candidate.  
 
Table 1. 2020 Solo Mayoral Election Result 
 
Sub-districts Gibran-Teguh Bajo 
Laweyan 35,581 6,762 
Serengan 20,564 3,241 
Pasar Kliwon 31,793 5,259 
Jebres 64,770 8,448 
Banjarsari 72,711 11,403 
Total 225,419 35,113 
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The voters turnout was 70.4%, lower than in the 2019 presidential election (85.92%) and the 
2015 mayoral election (73.5%). There were 419,347 registered voters for the 2020 mayoral 




Gibran’s victory in Solo (and also his brother-in-law Bobby Nasution’s victory in Medan) 
reveals more about President Jokowi’s political stature than Gibran’s impressiveness as a 
newcomer politician. It also marks a new stage in Jokowi’s political life, as he shifts from his 
populist image towards becoming a more normal Indonesian politician. 
 
He is no longer the Jokowi whose image was that of an outsider to Indonesian politics—he did 
not spring from Indonesia’s established political elites, and he did rise to power from humble 
beginnings. Indeed,  Jokowi is the first president to win with a “personal brand”. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, another president directly elected by the people, relied on his credentials 
as a military man being able to manage a government. Furthermore, Yudhoyono also created 
political parties to support him in power.  
 
Jokowi had had none of that. Instead he relied primarily on his ability to do deals with the 
political elites instead of challenging them, while carefully crafting an image of himself as part 
of the common people. 
 
With Gibran's victory, Jokowi becomes a professional politician in the Indonesian manner. 
Now he is part of the elite, and more than that, he now heads a political dynasty. The 
ascendance of Gibran (and Bobby Nasution) as mayor will certainly be assessed as part of 
Jokowi's success as well. 
 
Gibran's success also reinforces what has been pointed out by Meitzner (2013 and 2020), that 
elections in Indonesia are “personalized elections.”22  Parties in Indonesia are increasingly 
experiencing setbacks and the failure of PDIP cadre Achmad Purnomo to be candidate for 
mayor after serving the party for so long proves this. Gibran had joined the PDIP for only a 
few months before he became its candidate for mayor; and his candidacy was decided by party 
elites in dismissal of the internal dynamics of party at the local level. 
 
Weak party institutionalisation strengthens patronage and personal networks. This is not 
strange to democratic dynasties. Chandra (2015) argues that a democratic dynasty emerges 
because it is a way for creating more effective loyalties between leaders and followers.23   
 
	
1 The formal name of the city is Surakarta, but the informal and more affectionate name is Solo. This 
Perspective will use Solo instead of Surakarta.  
2 See for example, Marcus Mietzner, “How Jokowi Won and Democracy Survived,” Journal of 
Democracy, 25 no. 4, 2014, pp. 111-125.  
3 Kanchan Chandra, Democratic Dynasties: State, Party, and Family in Contemporary Indian 
Politics, London: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 
4 Daniel M. Smith, Dynasties and Democracy: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan, 
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5 Yoes C. Kenawas, “Dynastic Politics: Indonesia’s New Normal” 
https://electionwatch.unimelb.edu.au/articles/dynastic-politics-indonesias-new-normal  Retrieved in 
December 29, 2020. 
6 Editorial: “Dynasty in the Making,” The Jakarta Post, July 20, 2020. 
https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/07/20/dynasty-in-the-making.html  





9 “Gibran Tanyakan Mekanisme Pencalonan Walikota, Isyarat Terjun ke Politik?”, Solopos.com, 18 
September 2020 (https://www.solopos.com/gibran-tanyakan-mekanisme-pencalonan-wali-kota-solo-
isyarat-terjun-ke-politik-1019250, Retrieved 20 December 2020). 
10 “Rekomendasi DPP PDIP Untuk Pilkada Solo Jatuh Ke Gibran”, Solopos.com, 18 June 2020 
(https://www.solopos.com/rekomendasi-dpp-pdip-untuk-pilkada-solo-jatuh-ke-gibran-1066553, 
Retrieved 20 December 2020). In December 2018, Gibran claimed that the business he owned was 
built on his own name without intervention from his father, President Jokowi. Gibran also claimed 
that he proposed to be Surakarta’s Mayor by his own efforts and without parental intervention. On 
several occasions, Gibran stated that his decision to nominate himself as candidate in the mayor 
election was not motivated by Jokowi, but on his own will. 
11 Article 10 of PDIP Regulation Number 24/2017 states that the nomination process sits within the 
ranks of the PDIP. In this case, it means that the DPC (the party’s branch at the city/regency level) has 
the power to nominate a regional leader. 
12 https://www.merdeka.com/politik/fx-rudy-dukung-purnomo-mundur-pilkada-biar-diurus-dpp-dan-
dpd-pdip.html  
13 The Democrat Party - which won the 2009 presidential election in Surakarta – has no seat in the 
2019-2024 Surakarta DPRD. 
14 See Hengky Widjaya, “The 2020 Makassar Mayoral Election: Replay of an Unresolved Political Feud”, 
ISEAS Perspective No. 14, Feb. 17, 2021.  
15 Tikus Pithi Hanata Baris means mice marching in disciplined manner. It claims to represent ‘small 
people’ (working class people). There are however many dubious things about the organisation. It was 
registered in 2014. Its chairman, Tuntas Subagyo, was involved in a financial scandal, however. He 
claimed that he had discovered Indonesian treasures worth several billion US dollars hidden in some 
banks in Switzerland, and sought donations to enable him to file a lawsuit to retrieve those treasures. 
For the 2019 presidential election, Tikus Pithi asked the election commission to open opportunities for 
independent presidential candidates, but the party would not nominate anyone other than its chairman 
to be the candidate. The commission rejected this request as unconstitutional. In 2020, Tikus Pithi 
claimed that it had nominated several independent candidates for regional heads in Central Java and 
Yogyakarta. However, only Bajo in Solo met the requirements to run as an independent candidate. 
See, “Rekam Jejak Tikus Pithi, Getol Suarakan Calon Independen Sejak Pilpres 2019”, Solopos.com, 
5 August 2020 (https://www.solopos.com/rekam-jejak-tikus-pithi-getol-suarakan-calon-independen-
sejak-pilpres-2019-1074246, downloaded 20 December 2020) 
16 The “Industry 4.0” revolution has become a buzzword in President Jokowi's administration. This 
term was introduced by Klaus Schwab, Executive Chair of the World Economic Forum, and became 
the theme of the Annual WEF Meeting in Davos in 2016. President Jokowi’s administration launched 
what is known as 4IR (Industrial Revolution 4.0) which is a road map to make Indonesia's economy 
the 10th largest world economy based on GDP. See, Ministry of Industry of Indonesia, “Making 
Indonesia 4.0” n.d. https://bit.ly/39inCuR  
17 In simple terms, it could mean that their followers would influence their spouses to vote for him, 
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family would influence their community. In the past, a well (sumur) was usually shared by the whole 
community. 
18 See “Sekeluarga Di Setabelan Kaget Dicatut Sebagai Pendukung Paslon Bajo Di Pilkada Solo”, 
Solopos.com, 7 July 2020 (https://www.solopos.com/sekeluarga-di-setabelan-kaget-dicatut-sebagai-
pendukung-paslon-bajo-di-pilkada-solo-1069495, downloaded 20 December 2020); “Gakkumdu Solo 
Setop Penanganan Kasus Dugaan Pemalsuan Dukungan Paslon Bajo”, Solopos.com, 18 August 2020 
(https://www.solopos.com/gakkumdu-solo-setop-penanganan-kasus-dugaan-pemalsuan-dukungan-
paslon-bajo-1076400, downloaded 20 December 2020) “Pilkada Solo: Dugaan Makelar KTP a`gar 
Gibran Tak Lawan Kotak Kosong”, Tirto.id, 8 December 2020 (https://tirto.id/pilkada-Surakarta-
dugaan-makelar-ktp-agar-gibran-tak-lawan-kotak-kosong-f7Ty, downloaded 20 December 2020). 
19 “Pilkada Solo: Dugaan Makelar KTP agar Gibran Tak Lawan Kotak Kosong”, Tirto.id, 8 December 
2020 (https://tirto.id/pilkada-Surakarta-dugaan-makelar-ktp-agar-gibran-tak-lawan-kotak-kosong-
f7Ty, downloaded 20 December 2020) 
20 https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5285060/survei-pilkada-solo-indo-barometer-gibran-teguh-678-
bajo-cuma-4  
21 Tirto.id made a point when they noticed that if we add up Bajo’s voters with voters that were not 
exercising their rights and invalid votes, the total votes for Gibran-Tegush is only 56%. 
https://tirto.id/memaknai-kemenangan-gibran-saat-46-persen-dpt-solo-tak-memilihnya-f77C  
22 Marcus Mietzner, Money, Power, and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, 
Singapore: NUS Press (2013); and “Indonesian Parties Revisited: Systemic Exclusivism, Electoral 
Personalisation and Declining Intraparty Democracy,” in Thomas Power and Eve Warburton eds., 
Democracy in Indonesia: From Stagnation to Regression?, Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 
(2020), 191-209.   
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